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.When the SuezCanal Company reached a settlement with Nasser, moreover, the Americans evenopened the door to a possible accommodation with the Egyptian leader.32 Thesofter line towards Nasser continued into May, when Lebanese President CamilleChamoun, whose manoeuvring to extend his presidency prompted a civil war inwhich his opponents received Nasser s backing, indicated that he might soon requestAmerican military support under the auspices of the Eisenhower Doctrine.However,the administration expressed reluctance to become directly involved in Lebanon sinternal politics, tried to dissuade Chamoun from making a formal request, andundertook secret negotiations with Nasser to resolve the affair.33The 14 July overthrow of the pro-Western regime in Baghdad dramaticallyaltered the Eisenhower administration s perception of events in Lebanon and acrossthe region.The Free Officers movement within the Iraqi Army seized power andmurdered the Hashemite dynasty and Anglophile Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, and abrief outburst of street violence against the regime s former supporters and Westerninterests in Baghdad followed.Immediately assuming that Nasser was behind therevolution, and with the Saudi and Jordanian monarchs pressing for Western militaryintervention to halt the revolutionary ferment, Eisenhower responded quickly toChamoun s renewed appeal for American military intervention.34 For Eisenhower,the crisis represented a crucial test of American credibility in support of a loyal allywho had warmly embraced the Eisenhower Doctrine and stoutly maintained a pro-Western orientation.Failure to respond to Chamoun s desperate plea, Eisenhowerand Dulles believed, would erode confidence among friendly regimes across theregion.While much of the Arab world might be inflamed by American militaryintervention, decisive action would at least reassure the Northern Tier states andcommunicate American resolve to the Soviets.For Eisenhower, it was time to actor get out of the Middle East & To lose this area by inaction would be far worsethan the loss of China because of the strategic position and resources of the MiddleEast. 35 The first marines went ashore in Lebanon the next day.From the outset, however, fissures appeared in the Anglo-American response tothe crisis.In the British view, the Iraqi coup and Chamoun s domestic difficulties32 Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, pp.188 201; Rountree to Dulles, 24 March1958, FRUS, 1958 60, vol.XII, pp.48 54.33 Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser, pp.154 64.34 Allen Dulles briefing notes, 14 July 1958, WHO, Office of the Staff Secretary Records,International Series, Box 12, Middle East-Lebanon (1) (16 23 July 1958), DDEL.35 Goodpaster memo of conference with the President, 14 July 1958, FRUS, 1958 60,vol.XI (Washington, DC, 1992), pp.211 15; Douglas Little, His Finest Hour? Eisenhower,Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis , Diplomatic History, 20/1 (1996): 27 54. The Eisenhower Administration and US Strategy after Suez 189were part of Nasser s larger plot to spread his brand of radical pan-Arab nationalism,subvert pro-Western regimes, and eliminate the remaining British presence in theregion.Macmillan therefore pressed Eisenhower to undertake a broader, jointeffort to secure Western interests throughout the Middle East, but Eisenhower andDulles refused to be drawn into such an open-ended enterprise and used the pretextof constitutional constraints to sidestep British entreaties.The administration didapprove low-key Anglo-American military precautions to safeguard the vital PersianGulf oil area, particularly Kuwait.Nevertheless, Eisenhower set aside recentlycompleted Anglo-American contingency plans for joint intervention in Lebanonin favour of unilateral action, partly to avoid the appearance of acting in defenceof colonial interests, and also to forestall possible French demands to be party toany joint Western expedition.Instead, he gave half-hearted backing to the Britishmilitary intervention in Jordan to stave off an alleged coup against King Hussein, butrepeated pleas from the monarch and the British for at least a token American groundforce in Jordan failed to extract more than logistical support and a few ostentatiousoverflights by jet fighters.36Significantly, even as the first American and British forces landed in Lebanonand Jordan to provide short-term security, the widespread popular hostility in theArab world to renewed Western military intervention prompted the Eisenhoweradministration to revisit the question of long-term strategy towards the region [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.When the SuezCanal Company reached a settlement with Nasser, moreover, the Americans evenopened the door to a possible accommodation with the Egyptian leader.32 Thesofter line towards Nasser continued into May, when Lebanese President CamilleChamoun, whose manoeuvring to extend his presidency prompted a civil war inwhich his opponents received Nasser s backing, indicated that he might soon requestAmerican military support under the auspices of the Eisenhower Doctrine.However,the administration expressed reluctance to become directly involved in Lebanon sinternal politics, tried to dissuade Chamoun from making a formal request, andundertook secret negotiations with Nasser to resolve the affair.33The 14 July overthrow of the pro-Western regime in Baghdad dramaticallyaltered the Eisenhower administration s perception of events in Lebanon and acrossthe region.The Free Officers movement within the Iraqi Army seized power andmurdered the Hashemite dynasty and Anglophile Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, and abrief outburst of street violence against the regime s former supporters and Westerninterests in Baghdad followed.Immediately assuming that Nasser was behind therevolution, and with the Saudi and Jordanian monarchs pressing for Western militaryintervention to halt the revolutionary ferment, Eisenhower responded quickly toChamoun s renewed appeal for American military intervention.34 For Eisenhower,the crisis represented a crucial test of American credibility in support of a loyal allywho had warmly embraced the Eisenhower Doctrine and stoutly maintained a pro-Western orientation.Failure to respond to Chamoun s desperate plea, Eisenhowerand Dulles believed, would erode confidence among friendly regimes across theregion.While much of the Arab world might be inflamed by American militaryintervention, decisive action would at least reassure the Northern Tier states andcommunicate American resolve to the Soviets.For Eisenhower, it was time to actor get out of the Middle East & To lose this area by inaction would be far worsethan the loss of China because of the strategic position and resources of the MiddleEast. 35 The first marines went ashore in Lebanon the next day.From the outset, however, fissures appeared in the Anglo-American response tothe crisis.In the British view, the Iraqi coup and Chamoun s domestic difficulties32 Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, pp.188 201; Rountree to Dulles, 24 March1958, FRUS, 1958 60, vol.XII, pp.48 54.33 Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser, pp.154 64.34 Allen Dulles briefing notes, 14 July 1958, WHO, Office of the Staff Secretary Records,International Series, Box 12, Middle East-Lebanon (1) (16 23 July 1958), DDEL.35 Goodpaster memo of conference with the President, 14 July 1958, FRUS, 1958 60,vol.XI (Washington, DC, 1992), pp.211 15; Douglas Little, His Finest Hour? Eisenhower,Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis , Diplomatic History, 20/1 (1996): 27 54. The Eisenhower Administration and US Strategy after Suez 189were part of Nasser s larger plot to spread his brand of radical pan-Arab nationalism,subvert pro-Western regimes, and eliminate the remaining British presence in theregion.Macmillan therefore pressed Eisenhower to undertake a broader, jointeffort to secure Western interests throughout the Middle East, but Eisenhower andDulles refused to be drawn into such an open-ended enterprise and used the pretextof constitutional constraints to sidestep British entreaties.The administration didapprove low-key Anglo-American military precautions to safeguard the vital PersianGulf oil area, particularly Kuwait.Nevertheless, Eisenhower set aside recentlycompleted Anglo-American contingency plans for joint intervention in Lebanonin favour of unilateral action, partly to avoid the appearance of acting in defenceof colonial interests, and also to forestall possible French demands to be party toany joint Western expedition.Instead, he gave half-hearted backing to the Britishmilitary intervention in Jordan to stave off an alleged coup against King Hussein, butrepeated pleas from the monarch and the British for at least a token American groundforce in Jordan failed to extract more than logistical support and a few ostentatiousoverflights by jet fighters.36Significantly, even as the first American and British forces landed in Lebanonand Jordan to provide short-term security, the widespread popular hostility in theArab world to renewed Western military intervention prompted the Eisenhoweradministration to revisit the question of long-term strategy towards the region [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]