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.What seems to be Michael Dummett s object of knowledge is Frege s philosophyas Frege himself intended it to be in the end (see, for example, p.9); thus, Dummettclaims:precisely because Frege worked so single-mindedly at the perfection of histheories, every change, whether he commented on it or not, must be regarded The teleological mode of reading 95as fully deliberate; views expressed in the mature period must be taken as havingmore weight than earlier ones with which they conflict, and later formulationsof old views as having more weight than the earlier formulations.(p.7)20Now, Dummett does not deliver any explicit discussion of how he considers theconcept of intention and the relation between intention and texts, but in discussingFrege s conception of language, he makes the following general observation, pointingout that the use of language has a point (p.30), and he continues:To say that an activity has a point is not to say that it has a goal which canbe stated without reference to that activity; that, in other words, it is a meremeans to an independently statable end; but it is to say that there is a standardby which it may be judged as achieving or failing to achieve what it is intendedto achieve, (p.30, italics mine)21I take this to mean that what goes for language use in general must apply to Fregeas well, in so far as the point of activity should be Frege s intentions to producehis definitive work , and the standard by which to judge this point is accordinglyhis texts or rather, as we shall see, one of his texts.Thus, Dummett solves the problem of the relation between Frege s thoughtin the six periods by the presumption thatearlier views which, on the interpretation adopted, would flagrantly conflictwith his later ideas, and about which he says nothing explicit in his laterwritings, for or against, would have been repudiated by him in the later periodhad he been asked about them.(p.26)Now, Dummett notes that from 187922 until the year of Russell s paradox in 1903, almost everything he did was subordinated to the goal, conceived at the outset, ofproducing his magnum opus, Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik/The Basic Laws of Arithmetic/.(p.6, italics mine)In accordance with this view, and taking into account that Frege s last majorpublished work was Die Grundgesetze in two volumes (1893 and 1903, respectively),Dummett also asserts thatsince Grundgesetze was intended to be a definitive work, what it contains shouldbe given more weight than anything Frege wrote elsewhere, whenever thereis an overlap in subject-matter& there is therefore a presumption in favourof interpreting earlier writing in the light of Grundgesetze, rather than theother way around.Grundgesetze may help us to see the intention behind anearlier, less exactly formulated, statement, (p.9, italics mine)In Dummett s interpretation of Frege s philosophy, it appears as if works earlierthan Die Grundgesetze should be regarded as preliminary studies or first drafts : 96 The reading of theoretical texts The greater part of what he published before Grundgesetze is intended as a preliminarystudy for it (p.9, see also p.20), and first drafts don t count too much as canbe seen when Dummett discusses Frege s notion of content as employed inBegriffsschrift (Frege, 1980b; first published in 1879):When that undifferentiated notion is pressed, it proves not properly coherent,and it was just this that Frege came to realize, and that prompted him to adoptthe sense/reference distinction.It is a mistake for us to press the notion of contentwithout admitting that distinction and father on Frege some misbegotten theoryfor which there is no warrant even in his early writings.(p.20; cf.also p.301)23Now, Frege s Grundgesetze is not a completed work, which makes necessary asupplementary strategy in Dummett s reading.It causes Dummett to look elsewherein order to reconstruct ( deduce is the term he uses) what should have been inthat text were it complete (p.16).We may observe this when Dummett discusses atreatise that Frege worked upon but which he never wrote and in which, had itbeen written, an argument would have been found for Frege s theory of meaningas applying both to Frege s formal system and to natural languages:It is this justification that would have been contained in that comprehensivework on Logic that Frege repeatedly tried, and repeatedly failed, to write,(p.19, italics mine)24Although he wanted to write on the matter, Frege never composed to his satisfactionthe treatise on the subject (p.19) because, Dummett notes, when one reflects carefully(p.19) on the scattered writings of Frege on the philosophy of language, there are alsocertain unresolved tensions: observations made by Frege in differentconnections, though hardly ever in flagrant contradiction with one another,pull in opposite directions, leaving crucial questions unanswered.He mayhave been aware of some or all of these tensions, but unable to find a wayof resolving them.(p.19f)This makes it possible for Dummett to assert in this particular case that thecorrect interpretation of Frege s thoughts on language is to leave some questionsunanswered, as not being resolvable (p.20).It is here no longer a question ofwhat Frege would have said would he have written in some future on the matter.As in the case of Russell s paradox, Frege s conceptualizations puts a stop to theprocess.He cannot achieve what intentions he may have had.I think that by now sufficient indications have been accumulated to make theclaim that Dummett s mode of reading is in fact a reading teleologically dominated,with its concomitant author-function , as outlined above.We have seen that the analysis of Frege s philosophy has, indeed, been a historyread backwards , with Grundgesetze, the text where, according to Michael Dummett, The teleological mode of reading 97Frege s intentions are most nearly realized, functioning as the standard by whichall else may be judged the end product as starting point for the whole enterprise;an endeavour geared towards the creation of continuity and based upon Frege s(alleged) intentions, external to the texts under scrutiny.To this end, by the functionof the authors intentions, it has been possible to neutralize incoherences andtensions in earlier texts, as well as integrating exclusions by notions such as firstdraft or preliminary study and with the help of claims such as help us to seethe intention behind earlier texts and would have been contained or repudiated ,respectively [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.What seems to be Michael Dummett s object of knowledge is Frege s philosophyas Frege himself intended it to be in the end (see, for example, p.9); thus, Dummettclaims:precisely because Frege worked so single-mindedly at the perfection of histheories, every change, whether he commented on it or not, must be regarded The teleological mode of reading 95as fully deliberate; views expressed in the mature period must be taken as havingmore weight than earlier ones with which they conflict, and later formulationsof old views as having more weight than the earlier formulations.(p.7)20Now, Dummett does not deliver any explicit discussion of how he considers theconcept of intention and the relation between intention and texts, but in discussingFrege s conception of language, he makes the following general observation, pointingout that the use of language has a point (p.30), and he continues:To say that an activity has a point is not to say that it has a goal which canbe stated without reference to that activity; that, in other words, it is a meremeans to an independently statable end; but it is to say that there is a standardby which it may be judged as achieving or failing to achieve what it is intendedto achieve, (p.30, italics mine)21I take this to mean that what goes for language use in general must apply to Fregeas well, in so far as the point of activity should be Frege s intentions to producehis definitive work , and the standard by which to judge this point is accordinglyhis texts or rather, as we shall see, one of his texts.Thus, Dummett solves the problem of the relation between Frege s thoughtin the six periods by the presumption thatearlier views which, on the interpretation adopted, would flagrantly conflictwith his later ideas, and about which he says nothing explicit in his laterwritings, for or against, would have been repudiated by him in the later periodhad he been asked about them.(p.26)Now, Dummett notes that from 187922 until the year of Russell s paradox in 1903, almost everything he did was subordinated to the goal, conceived at the outset, ofproducing his magnum opus, Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik/The Basic Laws of Arithmetic/.(p.6, italics mine)In accordance with this view, and taking into account that Frege s last majorpublished work was Die Grundgesetze in two volumes (1893 and 1903, respectively),Dummett also asserts thatsince Grundgesetze was intended to be a definitive work, what it contains shouldbe given more weight than anything Frege wrote elsewhere, whenever thereis an overlap in subject-matter& there is therefore a presumption in favourof interpreting earlier writing in the light of Grundgesetze, rather than theother way around.Grundgesetze may help us to see the intention behind anearlier, less exactly formulated, statement, (p.9, italics mine)In Dummett s interpretation of Frege s philosophy, it appears as if works earlierthan Die Grundgesetze should be regarded as preliminary studies or first drafts : 96 The reading of theoretical texts The greater part of what he published before Grundgesetze is intended as a preliminarystudy for it (p.9, see also p.20), and first drafts don t count too much as canbe seen when Dummett discusses Frege s notion of content as employed inBegriffsschrift (Frege, 1980b; first published in 1879):When that undifferentiated notion is pressed, it proves not properly coherent,and it was just this that Frege came to realize, and that prompted him to adoptthe sense/reference distinction.It is a mistake for us to press the notion of contentwithout admitting that distinction and father on Frege some misbegotten theoryfor which there is no warrant even in his early writings.(p.20; cf.also p.301)23Now, Frege s Grundgesetze is not a completed work, which makes necessary asupplementary strategy in Dummett s reading.It causes Dummett to look elsewherein order to reconstruct ( deduce is the term he uses) what should have been inthat text were it complete (p.16).We may observe this when Dummett discusses atreatise that Frege worked upon but which he never wrote and in which, had itbeen written, an argument would have been found for Frege s theory of meaningas applying both to Frege s formal system and to natural languages:It is this justification that would have been contained in that comprehensivework on Logic that Frege repeatedly tried, and repeatedly failed, to write,(p.19, italics mine)24Although he wanted to write on the matter, Frege never composed to his satisfactionthe treatise on the subject (p.19) because, Dummett notes, when one reflects carefully(p.19) on the scattered writings of Frege on the philosophy of language, there are alsocertain unresolved tensions: observations made by Frege in differentconnections, though hardly ever in flagrant contradiction with one another,pull in opposite directions, leaving crucial questions unanswered.He mayhave been aware of some or all of these tensions, but unable to find a wayof resolving them.(p.19f)This makes it possible for Dummett to assert in this particular case that thecorrect interpretation of Frege s thoughts on language is to leave some questionsunanswered, as not being resolvable (p.20).It is here no longer a question ofwhat Frege would have said would he have written in some future on the matter.As in the case of Russell s paradox, Frege s conceptualizations puts a stop to theprocess.He cannot achieve what intentions he may have had.I think that by now sufficient indications have been accumulated to make theclaim that Dummett s mode of reading is in fact a reading teleologically dominated,with its concomitant author-function , as outlined above.We have seen that the analysis of Frege s philosophy has, indeed, been a historyread backwards , with Grundgesetze, the text where, according to Michael Dummett, The teleological mode of reading 97Frege s intentions are most nearly realized, functioning as the standard by whichall else may be judged the end product as starting point for the whole enterprise;an endeavour geared towards the creation of continuity and based upon Frege s(alleged) intentions, external to the texts under scrutiny.To this end, by the functionof the authors intentions, it has been possible to neutralize incoherences andtensions in earlier texts, as well as integrating exclusions by notions such as firstdraft or preliminary study and with the help of claims such as help us to seethe intention behind earlier texts and would have been contained or repudiated ,respectively [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]