[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.Particularly withcertain forms of proposition in psychology, such as 'A believes that p isthe case' and A has the thought p', etc.For if these are consideredsuperficially, it looks as if the proposition p stood in some kind ofrelation to an object A.(And in modern theory of knowledge (Russell,Moore, etc.) these propositions have actually been construed in this way.)5.542 It is clear, however, that 'A believes that p', 'A has the thoughtp', and 'A says p' are of the form '"p" says p': and this does not involvea correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of factsby means of the correlation of their objects.5.5421 This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul--the subject,etc.--as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day.Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul.5.5422 The correct explanation of the form of the proposition, 'A makes thejudgement p', must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a pieceof nonsense.(Russell's theory does not satisfy this requirement.)5.5423 To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents arerelated to one another in such and such a way.This no doubt also explainswhy there are two possible ways of seeing the figure as a cube; and allsimilar phenomena.For we really see two different facts.(If I look in thefirst place at the corners marked a and only glance at the b's, then thea's appear to be in front, and vice versa).5.55 We now have to answer a priori the question about all the possibleforms of elementary propositions.Elementary propositions consist of names.Since, however, we are unable to give the number of names with differentmeanings, we are also unable to give the composition of elementarypropositions.5.551 Our fundamental principle is that whenever a question can be decidedby logic at all it must be possible to decide it without more ado.(And ifwe get into a position where we have to look at the world for an answer tosuch a problem, that shows that we are on a completely wrong track.)5.552 The 'experience' that we need in order to understand logic is notthat something or other is the state of things, but that something is :that, however, is not an experience.Logic is prior to every experience--that something is so.It is prior to the question 'How?' not prior to thequestion 'What?'5.5521 And if this were not so, how could we apply logic? We might put itin this way: if there would be a logic even if there were no world, howthen could there be a logic given that there is a world?5.553 Russell said that there were simple relations between differentnumbers of things (individuals).But between what numbers? And how is thissupposed to be decided?--By experience? (There is no pre-eminent number.)5.554 It would be completely arbitrary to give any specific form.5.5541 It is supposed to be possible to answer a priori the questionwhether I can get into a position in which I need the sign for a 27-termedrelation in order to signify something.5.5542 But is it really legitimate even to ask such a question? Can we setup a form of sign without knowing whether anything can correspond to it?Does it make sense to ask what there must be in order that something can bethe case?5.555 Clearly we have some concept of elementary propositions quite apartfrom their particular logical forms.But when there is a system by which wecan create symbols, the system is what is important for logic and not theindividual symbols.And anyway, is it really possible that in logic Ishould have to deal with forms that I can invent? What I have to deal withmust be that which makes it possible for me to invent them.5.556 There cannot be a hierarchy of the forms of elementary propositions.We can foresee only what we ourselves construct.5.5561 Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects.The limitalso makes itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions.Hierarchies are and must be independent of reality.5.5562 If we know on purely logical grounds that there must be elementarypropositions, then everyone who understands propositions in their C formmust know It.5.5563 In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as theystand, are in perfect logical order.--That utterly simple thing, which wehave to formulate here, is not a likeness of the truth, but the truthitself in its entirety.(Our problems are not abstract, but perhaps themost concrete that there are.)5.557 The application of logic decides what elementary propositions thereare.What belongs to its application, logic cannot anticipate.It is clearthat logic must not clash with its application.But logic has to be incontact with its application.Therefore logic and its application must notoverlap.5.5571 If I cannot say a priori what elementary propositions there are,then the attempt to do so must lead to obvious nonsense.5.6 The limits ofmy language mean the limits of my world.5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but notthat.' For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certainpossibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require thatlogic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way couldit view those limits from the other side as well.We cannot think what wecannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there isin solipsism.For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannotbe said , but makes itself manifest.The world is my world: this ismanifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language whichalone I understand) mean the limits of my world.5.621 The world and life are one.5.63 I am my world.(The microcosm.)5 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl matkasanepid.xlx.pl
.Particularly withcertain forms of proposition in psychology, such as 'A believes that p isthe case' and A has the thought p', etc.For if these are consideredsuperficially, it looks as if the proposition p stood in some kind ofrelation to an object A.(And in modern theory of knowledge (Russell,Moore, etc.) these propositions have actually been construed in this way.)5.542 It is clear, however, that 'A believes that p', 'A has the thoughtp', and 'A says p' are of the form '"p" says p': and this does not involvea correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of factsby means of the correlation of their objects.5.5421 This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul--the subject,etc.--as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day.Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul.5.5422 The correct explanation of the form of the proposition, 'A makes thejudgement p', must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a pieceof nonsense.(Russell's theory does not satisfy this requirement.)5.5423 To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents arerelated to one another in such and such a way.This no doubt also explainswhy there are two possible ways of seeing the figure as a cube; and allsimilar phenomena.For we really see two different facts.(If I look in thefirst place at the corners marked a and only glance at the b's, then thea's appear to be in front, and vice versa).5.55 We now have to answer a priori the question about all the possibleforms of elementary propositions.Elementary propositions consist of names.Since, however, we are unable to give the number of names with differentmeanings, we are also unable to give the composition of elementarypropositions.5.551 Our fundamental principle is that whenever a question can be decidedby logic at all it must be possible to decide it without more ado.(And ifwe get into a position where we have to look at the world for an answer tosuch a problem, that shows that we are on a completely wrong track.)5.552 The 'experience' that we need in order to understand logic is notthat something or other is the state of things, but that something is :that, however, is not an experience.Logic is prior to every experience--that something is so.It is prior to the question 'How?' not prior to thequestion 'What?'5.5521 And if this were not so, how could we apply logic? We might put itin this way: if there would be a logic even if there were no world, howthen could there be a logic given that there is a world?5.553 Russell said that there were simple relations between differentnumbers of things (individuals).But between what numbers? And how is thissupposed to be decided?--By experience? (There is no pre-eminent number.)5.554 It would be completely arbitrary to give any specific form.5.5541 It is supposed to be possible to answer a priori the questionwhether I can get into a position in which I need the sign for a 27-termedrelation in order to signify something.5.5542 But is it really legitimate even to ask such a question? Can we setup a form of sign without knowing whether anything can correspond to it?Does it make sense to ask what there must be in order that something can bethe case?5.555 Clearly we have some concept of elementary propositions quite apartfrom their particular logical forms.But when there is a system by which wecan create symbols, the system is what is important for logic and not theindividual symbols.And anyway, is it really possible that in logic Ishould have to deal with forms that I can invent? What I have to deal withmust be that which makes it possible for me to invent them.5.556 There cannot be a hierarchy of the forms of elementary propositions.We can foresee only what we ourselves construct.5.5561 Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects.The limitalso makes itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions.Hierarchies are and must be independent of reality.5.5562 If we know on purely logical grounds that there must be elementarypropositions, then everyone who understands propositions in their C formmust know It.5.5563 In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as theystand, are in perfect logical order.--That utterly simple thing, which wehave to formulate here, is not a likeness of the truth, but the truthitself in its entirety.(Our problems are not abstract, but perhaps themost concrete that there are.)5.557 The application of logic decides what elementary propositions thereare.What belongs to its application, logic cannot anticipate.It is clearthat logic must not clash with its application.But logic has to be incontact with its application.Therefore logic and its application must notoverlap.5.5571 If I cannot say a priori what elementary propositions there are,then the attempt to do so must lead to obvious nonsense.5.6 The limits ofmy language mean the limits of my world.5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but notthat.' For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certainpossibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require thatlogic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way couldit view those limits from the other side as well.We cannot think what wecannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there isin solipsism.For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannotbe said , but makes itself manifest.The world is my world: this ismanifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language whichalone I understand) mean the limits of my world.5.621 The world and life are one.5.63 I am my world.(The microcosm.)5 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]