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.Since it must always comport itself inthis selfreferential way, its Being can be nothing which Daseincould be as complete.We can only conceive such a self-referential notion of Being, which the being concerned alwayshas to be, as temporality: as a way in which what one has beenis to be taken over.Inauthentic temporality takes over what onehas been as the simply past and completed, which shows itselfin what one has accomplished or failed to do, whilst lookingtowards one s future as something determinate which will besettled in time, by what happens.But to understand oneself inthis way is not to understand oneself as temporality, but as a Kierkegaard, Heidegger and the problem of existence 41being within the world like any other.It is the incompatibilitybetween such an understanding of one s Being and the way thatBeing must always be projected in one s dealings with beings inthe world which compels a recognition of one s Being astemporality.To understand one s Being as temporality isradically to distinguish it from the being of intra-worldly beings.It is to realize that one can only be that Being as one s Beingin the appropriation of the past without issue.And that can onlytake place if the past is regarded as itself without issue: not asfinished and determinate, but as constant possibility of beingtaken over.To understand oneself in this way is to engage inone s past as an ever renewable source of possibility, to engagein the constant renewal of one s heritage.It is in this thatgenuinely new creation lies and which enables man to have ahistory.27 Man has a history because he is historical: that is,exists as a being which must constantly take over its past aspossibility.Of course, for the most part a human being mustexist inauthentically, simply living at home in the familiar world.But he lives in accordance with his Being, lives it as his Being,in creation, in the bringing forth of what is new out of thepossibilities made available by his past.In this way he lives hisBeing as unheimlich, as essentially not at home in the world.Manis not a being among other beings: rather he is as theappropriation of what has been, as existing world, within whichany other being can have its Being, its own temporal mode.We can see in this way the sense underlying Heidegger sclaim that the question of Being has been forgotten.What hasbeen forgotten in philosophy is that Being is a question.Humanbeing only has access to beings through his nature as Being-inthe-World; it is only in so far as he is at first and for the mostpart absorbed in relations of purposiveness that beings arerevealed at all to him.In this manner, they are revealed in themode of unobtrusiveness and familiarity, as ready-to-hand, andonly through modifications of this can they reveal themselves inother ways: as objects of theoretical contemplation, for example.But he can be as Being-in-the-World only in so far as his Beingis temporality itself.Explicitly existing as such, he takes over hispast as possibility to allow the new to come forth.In this way,the past always exists as a question, as what poses a questionto Dasein, an open possibility.If Being is what we mustunderstand in order to have access to anything that is, including 42 Kierkegaard and modern continental philosophyourselves, then that is the essential question which our past isfor us.IIThis may indeed appear as a thinking into the Being of humanbeing which underlies Kierkegaard s criticisms of Hegel in termsof the existing individual , a thinking Kierkegaard himself wasunable to carry out being still in the grip of certain metaphysicalconceptions.In defence of this one may point to a central partof Kierkegaard s attack on Hegel: that Hegel s speculativeactivity aims at the formation of the System, the articulation ofthe Truth, the principle of reality making itself manifest inthinking that Truth, thought thinking itself.But system andfinality correspond to one another, but existence is precisely theopposite of finality.28 And this surely is because the existingindividual is constantly in process of becoming 29 and thisshould receive an essential expression in all his knowledge [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.Since it must always comport itself inthis selfreferential way, its Being can be nothing which Daseincould be as complete.We can only conceive such a self-referential notion of Being, which the being concerned alwayshas to be, as temporality: as a way in which what one has beenis to be taken over.Inauthentic temporality takes over what onehas been as the simply past and completed, which shows itselfin what one has accomplished or failed to do, whilst lookingtowards one s future as something determinate which will besettled in time, by what happens.But to understand oneself inthis way is not to understand oneself as temporality, but as a Kierkegaard, Heidegger and the problem of existence 41being within the world like any other.It is the incompatibilitybetween such an understanding of one s Being and the way thatBeing must always be projected in one s dealings with beings inthe world which compels a recognition of one s Being astemporality.To understand one s Being as temporality isradically to distinguish it from the being of intra-worldly beings.It is to realize that one can only be that Being as one s Beingin the appropriation of the past without issue.And that can onlytake place if the past is regarded as itself without issue: not asfinished and determinate, but as constant possibility of beingtaken over.To understand oneself in this way is to engage inone s past as an ever renewable source of possibility, to engagein the constant renewal of one s heritage.It is in this thatgenuinely new creation lies and which enables man to have ahistory.27 Man has a history because he is historical: that is,exists as a being which must constantly take over its past aspossibility.Of course, for the most part a human being mustexist inauthentically, simply living at home in the familiar world.But he lives in accordance with his Being, lives it as his Being,in creation, in the bringing forth of what is new out of thepossibilities made available by his past.In this way he lives hisBeing as unheimlich, as essentially not at home in the world.Manis not a being among other beings: rather he is as theappropriation of what has been, as existing world, within whichany other being can have its Being, its own temporal mode.We can see in this way the sense underlying Heidegger sclaim that the question of Being has been forgotten.What hasbeen forgotten in philosophy is that Being is a question.Humanbeing only has access to beings through his nature as Being-inthe-World; it is only in so far as he is at first and for the mostpart absorbed in relations of purposiveness that beings arerevealed at all to him.In this manner, they are revealed in themode of unobtrusiveness and familiarity, as ready-to-hand, andonly through modifications of this can they reveal themselves inother ways: as objects of theoretical contemplation, for example.But he can be as Being-in-the-World only in so far as his Beingis temporality itself.Explicitly existing as such, he takes over hispast as possibility to allow the new to come forth.In this way,the past always exists as a question, as what poses a questionto Dasein, an open possibility.If Being is what we mustunderstand in order to have access to anything that is, including 42 Kierkegaard and modern continental philosophyourselves, then that is the essential question which our past isfor us.IIThis may indeed appear as a thinking into the Being of humanbeing which underlies Kierkegaard s criticisms of Hegel in termsof the existing individual , a thinking Kierkegaard himself wasunable to carry out being still in the grip of certain metaphysicalconceptions.In defence of this one may point to a central partof Kierkegaard s attack on Hegel: that Hegel s speculativeactivity aims at the formation of the System, the articulation ofthe Truth, the principle of reality making itself manifest inthinking that Truth, thought thinking itself.But system andfinality correspond to one another, but existence is precisely theopposite of finality.28 And this surely is because the existingindividual is constantly in process of becoming 29 and thisshould receive an essential expression in all his knowledge [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]