[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
. 7The political debates over health care rationing that are occurring not onlyin the UK but also in almost every contemporary democracy clearly revealthe need to consider both procedures and outcomes in judging democraticjustice.At stake are both the conditions under which these decisions aremade and their content.Do the decision-making bodies bring together rep-resentatives of all the people who are most affected by the decisions? Are therepresentatives accountable to all their constituents? These procedural ques-tions cannot be answered in the context of these debates without also asking:to what extent is the substance of the decisions justifiable to all the peoplewho are bound by them? To exclude substantive criteria such as libertyand opportunity that judge the justice of decisions would be morally arbi-trary and incomplete according to deliberative democracy s own premise ofreciprocity.(To exclude substantive criteria would also be morally arbitraryand incomplete according to other premises that are often identified asfundamental to deliberative democracy, such as free and equal personhoodor mutual respect).To affirm that a democratic theory should include substantive principlesdoes not of course commit one to any particular set of principles.InDemocracy and Disagreement, we propose a set of principles that are both sub-stantive and procedural, and present arguments for their inclusion as part ofthe constitution of a deliberative democracy.8 The arguments we present areintended to be part of a deliberative process itself, and in fact include frag-ments from actual deliberations.For example, we argue that laws or policiesthat deprive individuals of the basic opportunities necessary for makingchoices among good lives cannot be mutually justified as a principle of reci-procity requires.The basic opportunities typically include adequate healthcare, education, security, work, and income, and are necessary for living adecent life and having the ability to make choices among good lives.Wetherefore would include a principle of basic opportunity as part of anyadequate theory of deliberative democracy.Critics who object that this principle is not mutually justifiable or thatother principles of equality are more mutually justifiable are effectivelyaccepting the idea that democratic theory should include substantive principles. 3118 Ch-21.qxd 11/13/03 9:48 AM Page 240240 Contemporary Political TheoryEven while challenging the content of the principles, they are neverthelessaccepting that the terms of the argument should be reciprocal.Such chal-lenges are welcome by the terms of the theory itself, which asks for reasonsthat can be publicly assessed by all those who will be bound by them.9 Thiskind of challenge can then become part of the continuing deliberativeprocess.The reason that such a challenge fits within the terms of a delibera-tive theory itself is that the principles of the theory per se have a morally andpolitically provisional status.Deliberative democratic theory can and should go beyond process.It canconsistently incorporate both substantive and procedural principles.Itshould go beyond process for many reasons that we have suggested, butabove all because its core principle reciprocity requires substantive aswell as procedural principles.Reciprocity is widely accepted as a core prin-ciple of democracy, but even those democrats who do not emphasize thisprinciple argue from ideals such as free and equal personhood, mutualrespect or avoidance of majority tyranny, which like reciprocity require bothsubstantive and procedural principles to justify the laws that democraciesadopt.Deliberative democratic theory is better prepared to deal with the range ofmoral and political challenges of a robust democratic politics if it includesboth substantive and procedural principles.It is well equipped to cope withthe conflict between substantive and procedural principles because its prin-ciples are to varying degrees morally and politically provisional.Deliberative democratic theory can avoid usurping the moral or politicalauthority of democratic citizens and yet still make substantive judgmentsabout the laws they enact because it claims neither more, nor less, thanprovisional status for the principles it defends.Notes1 As Jürgen Habermas writes, All contents, no matter how fundamental the actionnorm involved may be, must be made to depend on real discourses (or advoca-tory discourses conducted as substitutes for them) . Discourse ethics, MoralConsciousness and Communicative Action, trans.Christian Lenhardt and ShierryWeber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.Press, 1993), p.94.For comments andother citations, see our discussion in Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996),pp.17 18.Other theorists who would also be more inclined to limit deliberativedemocracy to process considerations and are therefore critical of including sub-stantive principles in its theory include: Jack Knight, Constitutionalism anddeliberative democracy Deliberative Politics, ed.Stephen Macedo (New York:Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.159 69; Cass Sunstein, Agreement withouttheory, ibid., pp.147 8; and Iris Marion Young, Justice, inclusion, and delibera-tive democracy, ibid., pp.151 8.For our reply, see Gutmann and Thompson, Democratic disagreement, ibid., pp.261 8.2 See statements by NICE s newly appointed director Michael Rawlins: RichardHorton, NICE: a step forward in the quality of NHS care, The Lancet, 353 3118 Ch-21 [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl matkasanepid.xlx.pl
. 7The political debates over health care rationing that are occurring not onlyin the UK but also in almost every contemporary democracy clearly revealthe need to consider both procedures and outcomes in judging democraticjustice.At stake are both the conditions under which these decisions aremade and their content.Do the decision-making bodies bring together rep-resentatives of all the people who are most affected by the decisions? Are therepresentatives accountable to all their constituents? These procedural ques-tions cannot be answered in the context of these debates without also asking:to what extent is the substance of the decisions justifiable to all the peoplewho are bound by them? To exclude substantive criteria such as libertyand opportunity that judge the justice of decisions would be morally arbi-trary and incomplete according to deliberative democracy s own premise ofreciprocity.(To exclude substantive criteria would also be morally arbitraryand incomplete according to other premises that are often identified asfundamental to deliberative democracy, such as free and equal personhoodor mutual respect).To affirm that a democratic theory should include substantive principlesdoes not of course commit one to any particular set of principles.InDemocracy and Disagreement, we propose a set of principles that are both sub-stantive and procedural, and present arguments for their inclusion as part ofthe constitution of a deliberative democracy.8 The arguments we present areintended to be part of a deliberative process itself, and in fact include frag-ments from actual deliberations.For example, we argue that laws or policiesthat deprive individuals of the basic opportunities necessary for makingchoices among good lives cannot be mutually justified as a principle of reci-procity requires.The basic opportunities typically include adequate healthcare, education, security, work, and income, and are necessary for living adecent life and having the ability to make choices among good lives.Wetherefore would include a principle of basic opportunity as part of anyadequate theory of deliberative democracy.Critics who object that this principle is not mutually justifiable or thatother principles of equality are more mutually justifiable are effectivelyaccepting the idea that democratic theory should include substantive principles. 3118 Ch-21.qxd 11/13/03 9:48 AM Page 240240 Contemporary Political TheoryEven while challenging the content of the principles, they are neverthelessaccepting that the terms of the argument should be reciprocal.Such chal-lenges are welcome by the terms of the theory itself, which asks for reasonsthat can be publicly assessed by all those who will be bound by them.9 Thiskind of challenge can then become part of the continuing deliberativeprocess.The reason that such a challenge fits within the terms of a delibera-tive theory itself is that the principles of the theory per se have a morally andpolitically provisional status.Deliberative democratic theory can and should go beyond process.It canconsistently incorporate both substantive and procedural principles.Itshould go beyond process for many reasons that we have suggested, butabove all because its core principle reciprocity requires substantive aswell as procedural principles.Reciprocity is widely accepted as a core prin-ciple of democracy, but even those democrats who do not emphasize thisprinciple argue from ideals such as free and equal personhood, mutualrespect or avoidance of majority tyranny, which like reciprocity require bothsubstantive and procedural principles to justify the laws that democraciesadopt.Deliberative democratic theory is better prepared to deal with the range ofmoral and political challenges of a robust democratic politics if it includesboth substantive and procedural principles.It is well equipped to cope withthe conflict between substantive and procedural principles because its prin-ciples are to varying degrees morally and politically provisional.Deliberative democratic theory can avoid usurping the moral or politicalauthority of democratic citizens and yet still make substantive judgmentsabout the laws they enact because it claims neither more, nor less, thanprovisional status for the principles it defends.Notes1 As Jürgen Habermas writes, All contents, no matter how fundamental the actionnorm involved may be, must be made to depend on real discourses (or advoca-tory discourses conducted as substitutes for them) . Discourse ethics, MoralConsciousness and Communicative Action, trans.Christian Lenhardt and ShierryWeber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.Press, 1993), p.94.For comments andother citations, see our discussion in Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996),pp.17 18.Other theorists who would also be more inclined to limit deliberativedemocracy to process considerations and are therefore critical of including sub-stantive principles in its theory include: Jack Knight, Constitutionalism anddeliberative democracy Deliberative Politics, ed.Stephen Macedo (New York:Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.159 69; Cass Sunstein, Agreement withouttheory, ibid., pp.147 8; and Iris Marion Young, Justice, inclusion, and delibera-tive democracy, ibid., pp.151 8.For our reply, see Gutmann and Thompson, Democratic disagreement, ibid., pp.261 8.2 See statements by NICE s newly appointed director Michael Rawlins: RichardHorton, NICE: a step forward in the quality of NHS care, The Lancet, 353 3118 Ch-21 [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]