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.207).The need to differentiate the various profiles and establish the autonomy ofparticipants in mass protest in the streets from the leadership of opposition move-ments has been supported by technical, sociological survey research in some set-tings.See, for instance, Opp, Voss, and Gern, Origins of a Spontaneous Revolution.This does not mean, however, that the participants would be politically effective ifthe leaders were not active as well in different capacities.We must be clear aboutthese sociological differences.81.However, the U.S.press reported linkages between the fsln and Communist Cuba.For example, twenty-two of the prisoners liberated by the National Palace operationhad gone to Cuba and were determined to return to Nicaragua to fight againstSomoza s government (Miami Herald, September 2, 1978, p.4a). 344 notes to pages 173--18682.Bohning, U.S.Reluctance to Act. I edit the quote for the sake of compactness.Bohning observed also: [Somoza s] public and private comments indicate a streakof stubbornness and suggest that he won t give it all up without more of a fightthan has yet been seen ( Nicaragua 1978 ).83.See Bohning, Many Strike Leaders Arrested. 84.Actually, one of the Twelve had just sent me a message that he would like to meetwith me in a neutral residence because if the Sandinistas knew about the contacthe would lose prestige with them.The Twelve wished to influence and moderate theSandinistas.Other non-Marxists were also active in the fsln, and the responsibilityfor the extant mess was past U.S.government support for the Somozas, the messagesaid.85.On September 8 the head count was eleven yes, two (Nicaragua and Paraguay) no,three don t know; the remainder were abstentions.Thirteen votes were needed to[344], (3convene the special meeting of foreign ministers, and seventeen were needed totake decisions in the body.Notice the slowness of the oas in taking any action.86.I wanted Washington to get an understanding of the situation and sent the followingLines: 7comment: Somoza appears confident he can surmount the present crisis and isreluctant to accept any mediation that could undermine his 1981 formula.He seems unaware of the extent of national opposition sentiment, and has decided to rely on 3.0pt government military and economic advantage to bend the opposition down to theNormalground.I believe he is contemplating taking the substance from Carazo s effortand outmaneuvering Central American presidents, whom he considers inferior. PgEnds:Somoza did not assume that the political equation was predetermined.If hecould alter U.S.policy, he thought, the equation would change in his favor.But[344], (3he misunderstood the situation.He defended himself, telling me that currentlythere was more violence in Colombia than in Nicaragua.This might have been thecase.But in Colombia the violentos were relatively isolated; there was not a broadcoalition involving the entire civil society to terminate the regime.It is not thevolume of violence per se that results in successful revolution.87.Several pieces published by the Miami Herald are useful to understand events: Nicaraguan Troops Advance on Rebels, September 14, 1978; Thompson, RebelsTried to Kill Me, September 14, 1978; Nicaragua Calls Its Reserves Up againstRebels, September 15, 1978; Long, Somoza Still Has the Firepower, September17, 1978; Millett, Battling a National Mutiny, September 17, 1978.88.September 15, 1978.89.Barricada was the name adopted by the newspaper of the triumphant revolution.90.Long, Somoza Still Has the Firepower. 91.Long, Somoza Still Has the Firepower. 92.Millett, Battling a National Mutiny. 93.The international press reported continued Panamanian support for the fsln.ASeptember 17 efe cable stated: A group of 30 Sandinista guerillas, who had en-tered Costa Rican territory yesterday after engaging in combat with the NicaraguanNational Guard, arrived today in Panama as political exiles.The Sandinistas ar- notes to pages 188--200 345rived.in a [commercial Costa Rican] airplane rented by the Panamanian Gov-ernment. 6.MediationIn this chapter, a few dates reported refer to when I registered the events in myjournal; because of my hectic schedule I could have been slightly off in somerecorded days.1.The private sector was well aware of the serious economic problems.In the Inter-national Monetary Fund a $21.6 million Compensatory Fund loan and a $30 millionstandby credit to the government had been postponed.The government was havingdifficulties with more than the imf.It was estimated that between August 25 andSeptember 21 there was a private capital flight out of the country of $60 million.Because of the lack of government funds, the usaid Reconstruction Program forManagua was at a standstill.The Central Bank reported for August that net reserves[345], (33)were about $40 million, which would cover average imports for only twenty-onedays; Instituto Nicaragüense de Desarrollo (inde), Circular to Members No.28, September 1978.Lines: 7622.The mpu was an incipient civic grassroots organization to complement and assistthe fsln armed activities.In contrast, the Twelve could be characterized as a group of notables.3.0pt Pg3.Before departing for Nicaragua, I met with Father Miguel D Escoto in the Wash- Normal Paington Office for Latin America (wola), a leftist group.He had wanted to take apicture of us to publicize our contact and his anti-Somoza campaign.He gave mePgEnds: TEhis blessing before our meeting ended, which I had considered definitely friendly.4.See the analysis of the documents in chapter 5.Incidentally, Alan Riding of the New[345], (33)York Times had suggested to me that I arrange to meet with the Twelve to clarify theircriticism of the embassy.5.However, in practice this international mediation was to some extent a disguise:everyone knew that the United States was or would have to be the decisive force.6.For details, see the Miami Herald story by Thompson, Rebels Tried to Kill Me. Mary Daniel and John Bargeron of our consular section were rewarded in this casewith letters praising their services, with copies sent to the president and secretary ofstate.However, Nicaraguan U.S.citizens who culturally were not Americans andwho were not intending to live in the United States that is, citizens only by the factof birth participated in the uprising.One of them, César Augusto Amador, waskilled while in police custody.In this case the prominent Amador family launchedan abusive public campaign against the embassy for more than a month.Accordingto them it was our duty to produce Amador, dead or alive.Amador s father was agentleman and later apologized in my office for the pressures exerted against usbecause of the family s anguish.The two cases, rightly so, consumed much energyon our part.7.The city was officially and publicly declared by the government entirely under itscontrol early in the morning of September 16.8.Gwertzman, U.S.Pressuring Somoza. 346 notes to pages 201--2029.Somoza himself aired these views for the American public that same day in aninterview.(See the MacNeil/Lehrer Report, September 19, 1978 [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
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.207).The need to differentiate the various profiles and establish the autonomy ofparticipants in mass protest in the streets from the leadership of opposition move-ments has been supported by technical, sociological survey research in some set-tings.See, for instance, Opp, Voss, and Gern, Origins of a Spontaneous Revolution.This does not mean, however, that the participants would be politically effective ifthe leaders were not active as well in different capacities.We must be clear aboutthese sociological differences.81.However, the U.S.press reported linkages between the fsln and Communist Cuba.For example, twenty-two of the prisoners liberated by the National Palace operationhad gone to Cuba and were determined to return to Nicaragua to fight againstSomoza s government (Miami Herald, September 2, 1978, p.4a). 344 notes to pages 173--18682.Bohning, U.S.Reluctance to Act. I edit the quote for the sake of compactness.Bohning observed also: [Somoza s] public and private comments indicate a streakof stubbornness and suggest that he won t give it all up without more of a fightthan has yet been seen ( Nicaragua 1978 ).83.See Bohning, Many Strike Leaders Arrested. 84.Actually, one of the Twelve had just sent me a message that he would like to meetwith me in a neutral residence because if the Sandinistas knew about the contacthe would lose prestige with them.The Twelve wished to influence and moderate theSandinistas.Other non-Marxists were also active in the fsln, and the responsibilityfor the extant mess was past U.S.government support for the Somozas, the messagesaid.85.On September 8 the head count was eleven yes, two (Nicaragua and Paraguay) no,three don t know; the remainder were abstentions.Thirteen votes were needed to[344], (3convene the special meeting of foreign ministers, and seventeen were needed totake decisions in the body.Notice the slowness of the oas in taking any action.86.I wanted Washington to get an understanding of the situation and sent the followingLines: 7comment: Somoza appears confident he can surmount the present crisis and isreluctant to accept any mediation that could undermine his 1981 formula.He seems unaware of the extent of national opposition sentiment, and has decided to rely on 3.0pt government military and economic advantage to bend the opposition down to theNormalground.I believe he is contemplating taking the substance from Carazo s effortand outmaneuvering Central American presidents, whom he considers inferior. PgEnds:Somoza did not assume that the political equation was predetermined.If hecould alter U.S.policy, he thought, the equation would change in his favor.But[344], (3he misunderstood the situation.He defended himself, telling me that currentlythere was more violence in Colombia than in Nicaragua.This might have been thecase.But in Colombia the violentos were relatively isolated; there was not a broadcoalition involving the entire civil society to terminate the regime.It is not thevolume of violence per se that results in successful revolution.87.Several pieces published by the Miami Herald are useful to understand events: Nicaraguan Troops Advance on Rebels, September 14, 1978; Thompson, RebelsTried to Kill Me, September 14, 1978; Nicaragua Calls Its Reserves Up againstRebels, September 15, 1978; Long, Somoza Still Has the Firepower, September17, 1978; Millett, Battling a National Mutiny, September 17, 1978.88.September 15, 1978.89.Barricada was the name adopted by the newspaper of the triumphant revolution.90.Long, Somoza Still Has the Firepower. 91.Long, Somoza Still Has the Firepower. 92.Millett, Battling a National Mutiny. 93.The international press reported continued Panamanian support for the fsln.ASeptember 17 efe cable stated: A group of 30 Sandinista guerillas, who had en-tered Costa Rican territory yesterday after engaging in combat with the NicaraguanNational Guard, arrived today in Panama as political exiles.The Sandinistas ar- notes to pages 188--200 345rived.in a [commercial Costa Rican] airplane rented by the Panamanian Gov-ernment. 6.MediationIn this chapter, a few dates reported refer to when I registered the events in myjournal; because of my hectic schedule I could have been slightly off in somerecorded days.1.The private sector was well aware of the serious economic problems.In the Inter-national Monetary Fund a $21.6 million Compensatory Fund loan and a $30 millionstandby credit to the government had been postponed.The government was havingdifficulties with more than the imf.It was estimated that between August 25 andSeptember 21 there was a private capital flight out of the country of $60 million.Because of the lack of government funds, the usaid Reconstruction Program forManagua was at a standstill.The Central Bank reported for August that net reserves[345], (33)were about $40 million, which would cover average imports for only twenty-onedays; Instituto Nicaragüense de Desarrollo (inde), Circular to Members No.28, September 1978.Lines: 7622.The mpu was an incipient civic grassroots organization to complement and assistthe fsln armed activities.In contrast, the Twelve could be characterized as a group of notables.3.0pt Pg3.Before departing for Nicaragua, I met with Father Miguel D Escoto in the Wash- Normal Paington Office for Latin America (wola), a leftist group.He had wanted to take apicture of us to publicize our contact and his anti-Somoza campaign.He gave mePgEnds: TEhis blessing before our meeting ended, which I had considered definitely friendly.4.See the analysis of the documents in chapter 5.Incidentally, Alan Riding of the New[345], (33)York Times had suggested to me that I arrange to meet with the Twelve to clarify theircriticism of the embassy.5.However, in practice this international mediation was to some extent a disguise:everyone knew that the United States was or would have to be the decisive force.6.For details, see the Miami Herald story by Thompson, Rebels Tried to Kill Me. Mary Daniel and John Bargeron of our consular section were rewarded in this casewith letters praising their services, with copies sent to the president and secretary ofstate.However, Nicaraguan U.S.citizens who culturally were not Americans andwho were not intending to live in the United States that is, citizens only by the factof birth participated in the uprising.One of them, César Augusto Amador, waskilled while in police custody.In this case the prominent Amador family launchedan abusive public campaign against the embassy for more than a month.Accordingto them it was our duty to produce Amador, dead or alive.Amador s father was agentleman and later apologized in my office for the pressures exerted against usbecause of the family s anguish.The two cases, rightly so, consumed much energyon our part.7.The city was officially and publicly declared by the government entirely under itscontrol early in the morning of September 16.8.Gwertzman, U.S.Pressuring Somoza. 346 notes to pages 201--2029.Somoza himself aired these views for the American public that same day in aninterview.(See the MacNeil/Lehrer Report, September 19, 1978 [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]