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.Third, the analysiswill turn to looking at public opinion dynamics after the events ofSeptember 11, 2001.In particular, it will focus on variance in public opinionduring the culmination of Oslo in the roadmap (2002), which outlined a two-state solution to the Israeli Palestinian conflict, through the beginning of thesecond Gulf War, which ousted Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq (2003).The periods outlined above are significant not just for their internationaldevelopments, but also because they overlapped with major changes indomestic public opinion and simultaneous revisions in strategy to influence hearts and minds by pro-Arab and pro-Israel advocates in the UnitedStates.Worthy of examination here is why American public opinion andpolicy went from granting the Palestinians no diplomatic recognition duringmost of the 1980s to insisting on their right to have a state that would existside-by-side with Israel after 2002.Hence, the central question of this chap-ter is what were the impacts of changes in public opinion on the roles of pro-Israel and pro-Arab organizations and their efforts on American foreignpolicy, which has called for a two-state solution to the Israeli Palestinian Public opinion, foreign policy perception 29conflict? This inquiry seeks to contribute to the debate over public opinion srelationship to interest groups and their interactions with policymaking.9 Itwill test the well established hypothesis that public opinion shapes politicaloutput.10 Mainly, the treatment below will look at whether foreign policybehavior and the elite perceptions surrounding it influence public opinion orwhether the relationship is the other way around.Regardless of the outcome,it will demonstrate that special interest groups on both sides of the ArabIsraeli conflict have a substantial stake in influencing public opinion for thefollowing reasons.First, if foreign policy and elite perceptions shape publicopinion, then direct lobbying is the better bet for any group seeking influ-ence, since only policymakers matter.Second, if there is a two-way effectbetween public opinion and foreign policy, then the manipulation of popularsentiment as well as direct pressure on politicians by interest groups areoptimal to controlling policy.Third, if public opinion shapes foreign policy,then influencing how citizens view world affairs will determine policy out-comes.All strategies are assumed to adapt to major international events.While the second strategy obviously offers the best possible path for pressuregroups, it is also true that in a world of limited resources, the pro-Arab lobbyand its pro-Israel rival must prioritize and focus their efforts in order tominimize their costs and maximize desired policy outputs.Hence, whatfollows is an examination of the role of public opinion in the ultimatepreference for the two-state solution.The Cold WarAdvancing the strategic relationship Despite some notable efforts to humanize them, the late 1970s and early1980s were a bad time for how Palestinians were viewed, with little regardfor Israel s occupation over them. 11 As pro-Arab advocates and scholarslike Mohammed K.Shadid were calling on the US to bring an end to an internationally threatening conflict by searching for a just and equi-table resolution of the Palestinian situation, the American public and itspolicymakers barely recognized the Palestinians as a people worthy ofattention.12 Some have argued that this was informed by a general lack ofrecognition for non-Western people and a long established narrative aboutthe Orient built upon a series of misunderstandings.13 According toDouglas Little, U.S.policymakers from Harry Truman to George W.Bushtended to dismiss Arab aspirations for self-determination as politically pri-mitive, economically suspect, and ideologically absurd. 14 On the flipside,there has always existed a wide-ranging belief that Israel and its Zionistpioneers were ineluctably transforming the dream of a Jewish state intoMiddle Eastern reality through blood, sweat, and tears. With attitudes likethis, it is of little wonder that during the 1980s the US nurtured a profoundalliance with Israel.15 30 Public opinion, foreign policy perceptionReflecting that, year after year, Americans tended to view the Jewish statewith favor.When asked about the warmth of the Israel US relationship in1986, the majority of Americans responded with high marks.16 While thathas been a continuing theme in opinion polls of the 1980s, responses aboutthe Palestinians, when they were considered at all, have been misinformed,sometimes hostile, but always preferring that they be kept at a distance fromAmerican support.Many attribute this fact to the framing of Israel as apartner of the West in the Cold War,17 a task that in no small measure pre-occupied its lobbying camp in the US.The Jewish state, with its conven-tional and nuclear military might, was believed to be a natural ally while themuch weaker Palestinians and other Arab nations were seen as unacceptablyneutral or worse, sympathetic to the Soviet Union.18 Pro-Israel lobbyistsunearthed many examples to support this view, such as Gamal AbdelNasser s founding of the non-aligned movement and his flirtation with theEastern Bloc during the 1950s and 1960s.Decades later, public opinion pollsexpressed enormous concern for Israel and its region.In the 1980s, there was great worry about the Middle East, especially itsposition in the Russo-American rivalry.During 1985, 58 percent ofAmericans believed that the problems between Israel and the Arab stateswould have a great chance of becoming a source of a major U.S.-Sovietconfrontation or war. 19 Another 25 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.Third, the analysiswill turn to looking at public opinion dynamics after the events ofSeptember 11, 2001.In particular, it will focus on variance in public opinionduring the culmination of Oslo in the roadmap (2002), which outlined a two-state solution to the Israeli Palestinian conflict, through the beginning of thesecond Gulf War, which ousted Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq (2003).The periods outlined above are significant not just for their internationaldevelopments, but also because they overlapped with major changes indomestic public opinion and simultaneous revisions in strategy to influence hearts and minds by pro-Arab and pro-Israel advocates in the UnitedStates.Worthy of examination here is why American public opinion andpolicy went from granting the Palestinians no diplomatic recognition duringmost of the 1980s to insisting on their right to have a state that would existside-by-side with Israel after 2002.Hence, the central question of this chap-ter is what were the impacts of changes in public opinion on the roles of pro-Israel and pro-Arab organizations and their efforts on American foreignpolicy, which has called for a two-state solution to the Israeli Palestinian Public opinion, foreign policy perception 29conflict? This inquiry seeks to contribute to the debate over public opinion srelationship to interest groups and their interactions with policymaking.9 Itwill test the well established hypothesis that public opinion shapes politicaloutput.10 Mainly, the treatment below will look at whether foreign policybehavior and the elite perceptions surrounding it influence public opinion orwhether the relationship is the other way around.Regardless of the outcome,it will demonstrate that special interest groups on both sides of the ArabIsraeli conflict have a substantial stake in influencing public opinion for thefollowing reasons.First, if foreign policy and elite perceptions shape publicopinion, then direct lobbying is the better bet for any group seeking influ-ence, since only policymakers matter.Second, if there is a two-way effectbetween public opinion and foreign policy, then the manipulation of popularsentiment as well as direct pressure on politicians by interest groups areoptimal to controlling policy.Third, if public opinion shapes foreign policy,then influencing how citizens view world affairs will determine policy out-comes.All strategies are assumed to adapt to major international events.While the second strategy obviously offers the best possible path for pressuregroups, it is also true that in a world of limited resources, the pro-Arab lobbyand its pro-Israel rival must prioritize and focus their efforts in order tominimize their costs and maximize desired policy outputs.Hence, whatfollows is an examination of the role of public opinion in the ultimatepreference for the two-state solution.The Cold WarAdvancing the strategic relationship Despite some notable efforts to humanize them, the late 1970s and early1980s were a bad time for how Palestinians were viewed, with little regardfor Israel s occupation over them. 11 As pro-Arab advocates and scholarslike Mohammed K.Shadid were calling on the US to bring an end to an internationally threatening conflict by searching for a just and equi-table resolution of the Palestinian situation, the American public and itspolicymakers barely recognized the Palestinians as a people worthy ofattention.12 Some have argued that this was informed by a general lack ofrecognition for non-Western people and a long established narrative aboutthe Orient built upon a series of misunderstandings.13 According toDouglas Little, U.S.policymakers from Harry Truman to George W.Bushtended to dismiss Arab aspirations for self-determination as politically pri-mitive, economically suspect, and ideologically absurd. 14 On the flipside,there has always existed a wide-ranging belief that Israel and its Zionistpioneers were ineluctably transforming the dream of a Jewish state intoMiddle Eastern reality through blood, sweat, and tears. With attitudes likethis, it is of little wonder that during the 1980s the US nurtured a profoundalliance with Israel.15 30 Public opinion, foreign policy perceptionReflecting that, year after year, Americans tended to view the Jewish statewith favor.When asked about the warmth of the Israel US relationship in1986, the majority of Americans responded with high marks.16 While thathas been a continuing theme in opinion polls of the 1980s, responses aboutthe Palestinians, when they were considered at all, have been misinformed,sometimes hostile, but always preferring that they be kept at a distance fromAmerican support.Many attribute this fact to the framing of Israel as apartner of the West in the Cold War,17 a task that in no small measure pre-occupied its lobbying camp in the US.The Jewish state, with its conven-tional and nuclear military might, was believed to be a natural ally while themuch weaker Palestinians and other Arab nations were seen as unacceptablyneutral or worse, sympathetic to the Soviet Union.18 Pro-Israel lobbyistsunearthed many examples to support this view, such as Gamal AbdelNasser s founding of the non-aligned movement and his flirtation with theEastern Bloc during the 1950s and 1960s.Decades later, public opinion pollsexpressed enormous concern for Israel and its region.In the 1980s, there was great worry about the Middle East, especially itsposition in the Russo-American rivalry.During 1985, 58 percent ofAmericans believed that the problems between Israel and the Arab stateswould have a great chance of becoming a source of a major U.S.-Sovietconfrontation or war. 19 Another 25 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]