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.The elements of strategy are widely familiar, yet they are seldomattained.The discipline required to examine all the hypotheticalsand to weigh all the options always seems to take too much timeaway from meeting the daily quota of mistakes and to be too muchtrouble until it s too late.The strategic enterprise begins with laying out goals, imaginingnightmare scenarios, and assessing all threats, problems, and op-portunities.All this must be boiled down to achievable objectives,priorities, and trade-offs among goals.There must be a rigorous ac-counting of the powers available to achieve the ends, which evolvesin good measure from a brutally realistic appraisal of the strengthsand weaknesses of all parties above all, one s own.These are hardto frame, and even harder to mesh together.More difficult still are two additional steps, which are much lessobvious than the others and more challenging to construct.One isthe first door process: the task of deciding what to do first to makeall subsequent actions easier.The second is to know the power Strategy and Power 99source, meaning which factors will provide power in both generaland particular situations.From all this can be derived the strategickernel, or the essential element of the strategy that will inspire anddrive the entire enterprise.The initial step, obviously, is to define the attainable objectives.It sounds easy, but it isn t.The tendency is invariably to state theloftiest of goals, the most desirable and the grandest.Who isn t forworld peace and the cessation of conflicts everywhere? Why exposeoneself to domestic critics eager to pounce on the weak-kneed whoare ready to compromise before the bargaining even starts? Alas,grand and unrealistic goals cannot be readily tossed into the gar-bage at night with only the cats taking notice.They accumulateconstituencies and become entrenched.But they have to be foughtoff because they invariably produce a stalemate at best and a costlydefeat at worst.Achievable goals, by contrast, provide room to maneuver athome and allow the nation s power to be focused more pragmati-cally abroad.Washington lacked the power to transform Iraq intoa democratic free-market paradise, and wasted enormous power onthis pipe dream.But it is conceivable that had Washington simplyfocused its considerable energies on providing decent security inIraq and on stabilizing the country, it could have reached this moremodest goal already.Washington could try to simply stop Moscow sexercise of its new power and fail, or it could attempt to build a newstrategic relationship with Moscow and restrain it that way andhave some chance of success.In sum, achievable goals make for achievements, and achieve-ments make for power and the potential for attaining even morepower.A fool is someone who defines a problem in such a way that itcan t be solved.If it can t be solved, it shouldn t be pursued.If failureto pursue it exposes major weaknesses, then you must look for suc-cesses elsewhere, where you can achieve them and use them to com-pensate for your failures.The major example of this is, of course, theNixon-Kissinger triangular diplomacy to cloud defeat in Vietnam.Second, strategy requires setting priorities and making trade- 100 Power Rulesoffs among objectives.But the American way is to want it all.Wash-ington wants Europe to put pressure on the Palestinians for a com-promise with Israel, but refuses to give the Europeans a responsiblerole in the negotiations.It can t have both.Washington wants todeploy a missile defense system in Poland over the Russians objec-tions, and also to enlist Moscow s help on Iran.It probably can t doboth.Putting objectives in some achievable order is the only wayto establish cohesion between policy and power.Without it, powerworks at cross-purposes, and fails.Setting realistic, achievable priorities also permits leaders to dis-tinguish the absolutely vital from the merely important and theimportant from the marginal.It s obvious that all power and re-sources are limited, and that choices have to be made among com-peting goals.And yet, astonishingly, politicians and pundits alikedeclare virtually every world event to be a historic crisis, and dragpresidents into needless messes.This happened repeatedly in theThird World during the Cold War, when Washington s operatingprinciple should have been that no place where we couldn t drinkthe water could be deemed a vital interest.By contrast, the Sovi-ets were brilliantly prudent in spending their limited power.WhileAmerican leaders routinely proclaimed nine-tenths of the globe tobe so vital as to require U.S.military protection, Moscow definedonly one region as strategic (their word for vital), namely EasternEurope.Foreign policy priorities, when openly explained and sold pub-licly, give the president a decent chance to conserve time and re-sources, two of the most precious commodities in applying power.Presidents have to save their power for the big challenges.CompareBush s decision to invade Iraq before he controlled Afghanistan withTruman s strategy of just pouring resources into Western Europeand Japan.The current Chinese leaders understand the importanceof priorities and don t allow anything to divert them from promotingtheir internal economic growth and maintaining domestic stability.Third, leaders must carefully assess their own nation s strengthsand weaknesses, as well as those of their allies and adversaries. Strategy and Power 101Where are you strong and weak, and where are others strong andweak? American openness is both a strength and a vulnerability [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.The elements of strategy are widely familiar, yet they are seldomattained.The discipline required to examine all the hypotheticalsand to weigh all the options always seems to take too much timeaway from meeting the daily quota of mistakes and to be too muchtrouble until it s too late.The strategic enterprise begins with laying out goals, imaginingnightmare scenarios, and assessing all threats, problems, and op-portunities.All this must be boiled down to achievable objectives,priorities, and trade-offs among goals.There must be a rigorous ac-counting of the powers available to achieve the ends, which evolvesin good measure from a brutally realistic appraisal of the strengthsand weaknesses of all parties above all, one s own.These are hardto frame, and even harder to mesh together.More difficult still are two additional steps, which are much lessobvious than the others and more challenging to construct.One isthe first door process: the task of deciding what to do first to makeall subsequent actions easier.The second is to know the power Strategy and Power 99source, meaning which factors will provide power in both generaland particular situations.From all this can be derived the strategickernel, or the essential element of the strategy that will inspire anddrive the entire enterprise.The initial step, obviously, is to define the attainable objectives.It sounds easy, but it isn t.The tendency is invariably to state theloftiest of goals, the most desirable and the grandest.Who isn t forworld peace and the cessation of conflicts everywhere? Why exposeoneself to domestic critics eager to pounce on the weak-kneed whoare ready to compromise before the bargaining even starts? Alas,grand and unrealistic goals cannot be readily tossed into the gar-bage at night with only the cats taking notice.They accumulateconstituencies and become entrenched.But they have to be foughtoff because they invariably produce a stalemate at best and a costlydefeat at worst.Achievable goals, by contrast, provide room to maneuver athome and allow the nation s power to be focused more pragmati-cally abroad.Washington lacked the power to transform Iraq intoa democratic free-market paradise, and wasted enormous power onthis pipe dream.But it is conceivable that had Washington simplyfocused its considerable energies on providing decent security inIraq and on stabilizing the country, it could have reached this moremodest goal already.Washington could try to simply stop Moscow sexercise of its new power and fail, or it could attempt to build a newstrategic relationship with Moscow and restrain it that way andhave some chance of success.In sum, achievable goals make for achievements, and achieve-ments make for power and the potential for attaining even morepower.A fool is someone who defines a problem in such a way that itcan t be solved.If it can t be solved, it shouldn t be pursued.If failureto pursue it exposes major weaknesses, then you must look for suc-cesses elsewhere, where you can achieve them and use them to com-pensate for your failures.The major example of this is, of course, theNixon-Kissinger triangular diplomacy to cloud defeat in Vietnam.Second, strategy requires setting priorities and making trade- 100 Power Rulesoffs among objectives.But the American way is to want it all.Wash-ington wants Europe to put pressure on the Palestinians for a com-promise with Israel, but refuses to give the Europeans a responsiblerole in the negotiations.It can t have both.Washington wants todeploy a missile defense system in Poland over the Russians objec-tions, and also to enlist Moscow s help on Iran.It probably can t doboth.Putting objectives in some achievable order is the only wayto establish cohesion between policy and power.Without it, powerworks at cross-purposes, and fails.Setting realistic, achievable priorities also permits leaders to dis-tinguish the absolutely vital from the merely important and theimportant from the marginal.It s obvious that all power and re-sources are limited, and that choices have to be made among com-peting goals.And yet, astonishingly, politicians and pundits alikedeclare virtually every world event to be a historic crisis, and dragpresidents into needless messes.This happened repeatedly in theThird World during the Cold War, when Washington s operatingprinciple should have been that no place where we couldn t drinkthe water could be deemed a vital interest.By contrast, the Sovi-ets were brilliantly prudent in spending their limited power.WhileAmerican leaders routinely proclaimed nine-tenths of the globe tobe so vital as to require U.S.military protection, Moscow definedonly one region as strategic (their word for vital), namely EasternEurope.Foreign policy priorities, when openly explained and sold pub-licly, give the president a decent chance to conserve time and re-sources, two of the most precious commodities in applying power.Presidents have to save their power for the big challenges.CompareBush s decision to invade Iraq before he controlled Afghanistan withTruman s strategy of just pouring resources into Western Europeand Japan.The current Chinese leaders understand the importanceof priorities and don t allow anything to divert them from promotingtheir internal economic growth and maintaining domestic stability.Third, leaders must carefully assess their own nation s strengthsand weaknesses, as well as those of their allies and adversaries. Strategy and Power 101Where are you strong and weak, and where are others strong andweak? American openness is both a strength and a vulnerability [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]